Kamala Harris did not lose because she pandered to the right or because she abandoned progressive policies popular with college students. She lost because Democratic purity tests alienated voters and because of the global backlash against incumbents.
Most Americans did not vote on policy. If they had, they would have voted for Kamala Harris because they overwhelmingly and unknowingly supported her agenda. This was Harris’ key problem — not a chasm between her stances and those of voters, but between voters and accurate information.
To the extent that swing voters did consider policy, many more identified Harris as too progressive than as too conservative. This is especially true of those that broke for Trump and delivered him the electoral college.
Context matters, too. Biden and Harris are roughly as popular as leaders of other liberal democracies — that is, they are deeply unpopular. Harris performed much better than other incumbents recently up for re-election. We were working against an international tide of dissatisfaction and we are mistaken to attribute Harris’ loss entirely to her ideology or strategy.
If we wish to litigate Harris’ choices, little evidence suggests that she lost because she shifted too far right on Gaza, fracking or any other issue. The sum of votes for Jill Stein and Cornel West pales in comparison to the votes separating Harris and Trump. Maybe dissatisfied leftist voters did not show up, but then again, they rarely do (assuming they exist in large numbers at all). This gives candidates like Harris no reason to consider them in crafting a campaign.
I am not arguing about policy, maybe leftist positions are better. But, in that case, leftists’ problem is not with Harris or with Democrats, but with voters. As the polling cited above suggests, it is delusional to argue that the median voter is as far left of Harris as are some college students.
The party’s problem is not that it has shifted too far right, but the opposite: the elevation of too many progressive stances to dogma. To exist comfortably in the party, one must support entitlements, gun control, affirmative action and reproductive rights; one must oppose fossil fuels, significant tax cuts and deregulation. These positions are used as cudgels against those who step out of the party line. But, by trying to pursue all at once, we fail miserably.
This strategy has lost us the most valuable Democrats in America: Joe Manchin. So many progressives vilify Manchin as a coal shill and recalcitrant conservative. And maybe he is those things. But, he was also the key to hundreds of liberal judicial appointments, significant emission reductions, a price cap on insulin for seniors, and drug price negotiations. The comparison should not be Joe Manchin versus Bernie Sanders, but Joe Manchin versus Mitch McConnell.
Our hemorrhaging of elected officials like Manchin goes hand in hand with our loss of moderate voters. Insistence on ideological purity has destroyed Democrats’ credibility with organized labor and working class voters of all races (especially white ones). A durable majority in 2026 and beyond will require buy-in from more gun-and-gas-loving Americans who support expanded Medicaid and a woman’s right to choose, or similarly idiosyncratic views. Our ability to win back the Senate will require more Joe Manchins in states like Nebraska and Alaska.
Some may counter that Democrats should not sacrifice what is right for what is expedient. I agree. I am not advocating for the Democratic party to shift right as an institution. Joe Biden is among America’s most progressive presidents (more so than Obama) and we are better for it. Wage growth is fastest at the bottom for the first time in a long time, emissions are set to fall by 50% and we cut child poverty in half until Republicans intervened.
We should not accept Joe Manchins from blue states (like Joe Lieberman of Connecticut), but we also should not demand Bernie Sanders from red states (like Beto O’Rourke). I am arguing for more tolerance of heterodox and conservative views within the overall liberal bloc. Come 2029, a 58-seat Democratic majority in the Senate with nine Joe-Manchin-like votes will more effectively enact progressive policy than a 49-seat, ideologically pure Democratic minority.
Last Tuesday’s result calls us to be more welcoming of voters and candidates with disparate views — to not demand purity from our voters and candidates. A progressive majority cannot exist if its members must be progressive on all issues at once. Those significantly to the left of Kamala Harris may argue they are correct on the merits, but their task now is to convince voters, not politicians.
